Decentralization or integration: Distribution channel selection under environmental taxation by Bian, Junsong et al.
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
Odette School of Business Publications Odette School of Business 
2018 
Decentralization or integration: Distribution channel selection 
under environmental taxation 
Junsong Bian 
Macquarie University 
Xiaolei Guo 
University of Windsor 
Kevin Li 
University of Windsor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/odettepub 
 Part of the Business Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bian, Junsong; Guo, Xiaolei; and Li, Kevin. (2018). Decentralization or integration: Distribution channel 
selection under environmental taxation. Transportation Research, Part E: Logistics and Transportation 
Review, 113, 170-193. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/odettepub/135 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Odette School of Business at Scholarship at 
UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Odette School of Business Publications by an authorized 
administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
Decentralization or Integration: Distribution Channel Selection under Environmental 
Taxation
Junsong Bian
Faculty of Business and Economics
Macquarie University, NSW, 2109, Australia
Email: junsong.bian@mq.edu.au
Xiaolei Guo
Odette School of Business, University of Windsor
401 Sunset Ave., Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, Canada
Email: guoxl@uwindsor.ca
Kevin W. Li*
College of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University
Fuzhou, Fujian 350116, China
and
Odette School of Business, University of Windsor
401 Sunset Ave., Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, Canada
Email: kwli@uwindsor.ca
Acknowledgments:
The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support from the National Natural Science 
Foundation of China (Grant #: 71572040), FedDev grants, and their Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) Discovery Grants. Kevin W. Li would also 
like to express his gratitude to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) for its 
Invitation Fellowship that allowed him to work on this research during his sabbatical leave in the 
Department of Value and Decision Sciences at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. 
_____________________
* Corresponding author. Telephone: 1 (519) 253-3000 ext 3456.
11 Decentralization or Integration: Distribution Channel Selection under Environmental 
2 Taxation 
3 Abstract
4 This study reveals that the environmental tax gets less stringent when the manufacturer’s 
5 distribution channel becomes more decentralized. Contrary to the classic double marginalization 
6 problem, the first implication is that a monopolistic manufacturer benefits from decentralization 
7 when its technology is sufficiently polluting. Secondly, with two competing manufacturers, both 
8 are more likely to decentralize in equilibrium when their technologies are more polluting. Under 
9 certain conditions, decentralized manufacturers may enjoy higher profits thanks to tax cuts without 
10 affecting social welfare or consumer surplus. Various extensions of the base models confirm the 
11 robustness of the analytical results. 
12 Keywords: Channel selection; environmental tax; supply chain management; game theory. 
13 1. Introduction 
14 The development of global economy has given rise to many environmental issues. For instance, 
15 climate change is one of the most important environmental problems spurring numerous 
16 discussions from both practitioners and academia. Furthermore, air pollution, water pollution and 
17 solid wastes, among many others, also cause serious environmental deterioration without proper 
18 care and intervention. Confronted with such environmental issues, governments have implemented 
19 various policies to curb pollution. In particular, environmental taxation, which directly follows the 
20 “Polluter-Pays Principle”, has been strongly supported by most OECD and EU countries (Morin 
21 and Orsini 2015).
22 Taking carbon taxes as an example: they have been widely implemented in European 
23 countries such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, 
224 Sweden, Switzerland and UK (Andersen 2010). As reported by the European Environment 
25 Agency (2006), taxation has been the most widely used environmental policy in Europe. In Asia, 
26 carbon taxes have been imposed by Japan and India (SBS, 2016). Specifically, Japan 
27 implemented a carbon tax in October 2012, and the tax revenue is used to subsidize clean energy 
28 and energy saving projects. In July 2010, India introduced a nationwide carbon tax of 50 rupees 
29 per metric ton of coal, which has been increased to 100 rupees per metric ton in 2014. In North 
30 America, some US states (Oregon, New York and Washington) and Canadian provinces (Alberta, 
31 British Columbia and Quebec) have implemented carbon taxes. Besides carbon taxes, there exist 
32 other forms of environmental taxes such as landfill fees and water pollution taxes (OECD 2001). 
33 In this paper, we refer to environmental taxes as generic environment-related taxes imposed 
34 on industrial pollution such as air pollution, water pollution and landfill wastes. We focus on 
35 discussing how distribution channel structures vary under such environmental taxation in the 
36 context of supply chain management. It is well-known that channel decentralization suffers from 
37 double marginalization (Spengler 1950). We attempt to reveal a benefit of decentralization under 
38 endogenous environmental tax policies, where the government sets a tax rate to maximize social 
39 welfare. We aim to address the following research questions: How does the government’s 
40 taxation policy vary under different distribution channel structures? Do distribution channel 
41 strategies change when the government imposes an environmental tax? What is the impact of 
42 environmental taxation on the equilibrium channel strategies under supply chain competition? 
43 How do competition intensity and technology polluting level affect distribution channel 
44 structures? 
45 The main findings are as follows. The environmental tax becomes less stringent when the 
46 distribution channel becomes more decentralized. The reason is that a more decentralized channel 
347 tends to produce less due to double marginalization, and thereby is less polluting. This has 
48 important implications on manufacturers’ channel strategies. First, contrary to the classic double 
49 marginalization problem, a monopolistic manufacturer can benefit from decentralization when its 
50 technology is sufficiently polluting. Second, with two competing manufacturers, both are more 
51 likely to decentralize in equilibrium when their technologies are more polluting. Moreover, 
52 manufacturers’ higher profits under decentralization stem from the tax cut for the less polluting 
53 industry structure, which does not affect social welfare or consumer surplus as long as their 
54 technologies are polluting enough that environmental taxation remains necessary.
55 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature related 
56 to this paper. Section 3 analyzes distribution channel strategies in a single supply chain. Section 4 
57 presents extensions and discussions with linear environmental damage, integration efficiency, 
58 transport emission, quadratic taxation, an environmentally-friendly manufacturer, and by 
59 allowing subsidies. Section 5 further extends the analysis to the case of two competing supply 
60 chains. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
61 2. Related Literature 
62 Two streams of literature are closely related to our research, the first stream on supply chain 
63 channel design, and the second stream on environmental policy and market structure. Extensive 
64 research has been carried out on supply chain channel design. The pioneering work of McGuire 
65 and Staelin (1983) revealed that intermediaries can serve as competition buffers, i.e., 
66 decentralization mitigate product market competition. In equilibrium, they showed that the 
67 integrated channels always occur and the decentralized channels arise when the products are 
68 highly substitutable. Moorthy (1988) revisited channel design and found that the equilibrium 
69 channel strategies do not depend on demand substitution (as in McGuire and Staelin (1983)) or 
470 complementarity, but depend on whether the price decisions are strategic substitutes or 
71 complements at both channel levels. 
72 Building upon the aforementioned research, Bhardwaj and Balasubramanian (2005) 
73 generalized the work of McGuire and Staelin (1983) with managerial incentives and found that 
74 mixed channels can also arise in equilibrium. Cao et al. (2010) extended the model of McGuire 
75 and Staelin (1983) by adding demand uncertainty. Anderson and Bao (2010) compared 
76 integrated and decentralized channels and focused on the effect of the number of supply chains. 
77 Considering upstream collusion, Piccolo and Reisinger (2011) showed that the discount factor 
78 can affect the manufacturers’ channel structures. Unlike these studies, we examine channel 
79 strategies when the government imposes an environmental tax on the production of the 
80 manufacturer(s). Our research reveals that environmental taxes can significantly change the 
81 equilibrium channel strategies. 
82 Some studies discussed channel strategies with non-price competition. With quality 
83 competition, Zhao et al. (2009) found that both manufacturers only choose integration in 
84 equilibrium. Liu and Tyagi (2011) showed that product positioning competition can significantly 
85 relax the ensuing price competition and make the retailers decentralize upward in equilibrium. 
86 Considering displayed-quantity competition, Zhou and Cao (2014) demonstrated that various 
87 channel structures can arise in equilibrium. Instead of adding non-price competition, we 
88 concentrate on the effect of environmental taxation on distribution channel design. We find that, 
89 even in a single supply chain, the manufacturer benefits much more from decentralization than 
90 from integration when its technology is sufficiently damaging to the environment. Furthermore, 
91 with two competing supply chains, we demonstrate that the manufacturers are more likely to 
92 decentralize in equilibrium when their technologies are more environmentally damaging. 
593 Within a single supply chain, Desai et al. (2004) and Arya and Mittendorf (2006) also found 
94 that a manufacturer can benefit from channel decentralization. They examined channel strategies 
95 in a multi-period setting where the time-inconsistency problem can be alleviated by 
96 decentralization. Differing from these two studies, we show that, even in a single period, the 
97 manufacturer’s profit from the decentralized channel can be significantly higher than that from 
98 the integrated channel under environmental taxation. Some other studies focused on dual-channel 
99 supply chain design, including Balasubramanian (1998), Chiang et al. (2003), Cattani et al. 
100 (2006), Arya et al. (2008), Xu et al. (2010), Xia et al. (2013), and Pun (2013). Unlike these 
101 studies, we concentrate on single-channel distribution strategies. 
102 The second branch of literature related to this paper is on environmental policy and market 
103 structure, dating back to Lee (1975) and Smith (1976), which revealed that market structure has 
104 an important effect on the efficiency of environmental taxation. Following their works, many 
105 other studies revisited the relationship between market structure and environmental taxation. 
106 Oates and Strassmann (1984) examined the efficiency of environmental taxation in a mixed 
107 market consisting of various types of organizations such as private and public firms. Conrad and 
108 Wang (1993) compared pollution taxes and abatement subsidies under three market structures: 
109 perfect competition, oligopolistic competition and a dominant firm with a competitive fringe. 
110 More relevantly, Markusen et al. (1993) discussed environmental taxation in a two-market, two-
111 firm model where firms locate their plants endogenously. They demonstrated that the social cost 
112 can be very high if environmental taxation ignores market endogeneity. With oligopolistic 
113 competition, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) found that the optimal emissions tax could 
114 exceed marginal environmental damage under endogenous market structure. Similarly, Lee 
115 (1999) revisited environmental taxation under an endogenous oligopolistic market structure and 
6116 found that the equilibrium number of firms in a market may differ from the socially optimal 
117 number of firms. 
118 Althammer and Bucholz (1999) discussed how market structures impact the second-best 
119 choice of the environmental tax. Cato (2010) proposed a three-part environmental tax policy in 
120 an endogenous market structure and found that it works effectively. Sheu (2011) examined the 
121 impact of government financial intervention on cooperative negotiations between manufacturers 
122 and reverse-logistics suppliers using an asymmetrical Nash bargaining game. Hafezalkotob 
123 (2017) developed a model of competition and cooperation between two green supply chains, and 
124 found that the government can reconcile social, financial, and environmental objectives with an 
125 appropriate tariff mechanism. For a comprehensive review on environmental policy and green 
126 supply chains, readers are referred to Carraro et al (2013) and Gunasekaran et al (2015). Our 
127 research departs from the aforementioned works from two aspects. First, we examine 
128 environmental taxation with vertical market structures in supply chains, while they all focused on 
129 horizontal market structures. Second, we study distribution channel strategies, while they 
130 examined other issues like plant locations and the number of firms in a market. Park et al. (2015) 
131 discussed whether the supply chain structure and social welfare vary with carbon fees charged. 
132 They studied supply chain design in terms of how many retailer stores to open for the retailer(s) 
133 in a horizontal market, while we focus on vertical distribution channel design with regard to 
134 whether the manufacturer(s) will vertically integrate or decentralize under endogenous 
135 environmental taxation. 
136 3. Channel strategies in a single supply chain 
137 This section starts with a list of notations used in the subsequent analyses.
7139 Table 1. Notations for the case of a single supply chain.
Variable and 
parameter
Definition
q Production quantity
p The retail price of the product
t Environmental tax rate per unit 
d The coefficient measuring how environmentally damaging the 
manufacturer’s technology is, with a higher  indicating a more polluting d
technology.
 The market potential.
w The wholesale price of the products
 The coefficient capturing demand sensitivity
SW Social welfare incorporating environmental externalities
140 Next, we consider a single-product supply chain with the stylized inverse demand function 
141 ,  p q q  
142 where  is the market clearing price under quantity ,  is the price cap, and  measures the p q  
143 sensitivity of retail price to demand change. Based on this, we obtain the demand function as 
144 . (1)  pq p  

145 This demand function is derived based on the well-known quadratic utility, which is consistent 
146 with the law of diminishing marginal utility (Spence, 1976). Without loss of generality, the 
147 manufacturer’s marginal production cost is normalized to zero.
8148 Based on Spence (1976), Pal and Saha (2015), and the references therein, we can derive 
149 social welfare, which is the sum of consumer surplus and the profit of the firm(s), and 
150 incorporates the manufacturer’s production externalities as 
151  (2)
 Traditional social welfareEnvironmental damage Environmental damageTraditional social welfare
2 2 2
0
1 1 1( )   
2 2 2
q
SW x dx dq q q dq           

152 where the first term is the traditional social welfare, equal to the sum of firm profits ( )  q q 
153 and consumer surplus ( ) and the second term measures environmental damage cost 21
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q
154 resulting from the manufacturer’s production emission. The coefficient  is related to how 0d 
155 environmentally damaging the manufacturer’s technology is, with a higher  indicating a more d
156 polluting technology. The quadratic function of environmental damage characterizes diminishing 
157 returns as it shows that subsequent production is progressively more damaging to the 
158 environment. From a theoretical perspective, this treatment is consistent with previous literature 
159 such as Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002), Poyago-Theotoky (2007), and Ouchida 
160 and Goto (2014). On the other hand, to examine the robustness of our results, Section 4.1 
161 examines the case with a linear environmental damage cost.  
162 The following analysis is performed in a game-theoretic setting and the decision sequence is 
163 shown in Figure 1. First, the manufacturer decides whether to adopt an integrated or a 
164 decentralized channel. Next, the government chooses a per unit tax rate to be imposed on the 
165 manufacturer’s production. Subsequently, the manufacturer chooses a retail price in the 
166 integrated channel or a wholesale price in the decentralized channel given the government’s tax 
167 rate decision. In the decentralized channel, there will be another stage in which the retailer 
168 decides the retail price, conditional on the wholesale price and tax rate decisions. 
9169
The manufacturer decides whether 
to integrate or decentralize
The government sets a per-unit tax rate to be 
imposed on the manufacturer’s production
The manufacturer chooses a retail price in the 
integrated channel or a wholesale price in a 
decentralized channel
The retailer determines the retail price if 
the manufacturer chooses to decentralize
170 Figure 1. Decision sequence with a single supply chain
171 3.1. When the manufacturer chooses an integrated channel 
172 We first consider the integrated channel, where the manufacturer directly sells its product to 
173 the end market. Given the decision sequence, the game is solved backward to ensure sub-game 
174 perfection. Thus, we start from the manufacturer’s decision. Given the government’s per unit tax 
175 rate , the manufacturer solves the following profit-maximization problem t
176 (3)   max IMp p t q p  
177 where the superscript “I” denotes the integrated channel in this benchmark model and the 
178 subscript “M” indexes the manufacturer. Solving problem (3) yields the manufacturer’s pricing 
179 decision 
180 . (4) 
2
I tp t  
181 Anticipating Eq. (4), the government’s objective is to set a tax rate to maximize social 
182 welfare given by Eq. (2), yielding 
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183 . (5)
,  if 
0,  otherwise
I
d d
dt
  
   
184 Mathematically, tI is continuous in d. However, when , we will have a negative tax, d 
185 corresponding to a subsidy to the manufacturer. This subsidy can be interpreted from two 
186 different perspectives. From a traditional economic efficiency perspective, this subsidy is due to 
187 the manufacturer, as a monopolist, exercising its market power to produce too little. In this case, 
188 the problem at hand is not the environmental damage caused by excessive production but the 
189 economic efficiency loss caused by underproduction. It is unreasonable for the government to 
190 subsidize a monopolist who exercises its market power. Therefore, we do not consider negative 
191 tax as shown in Eq. (5). On the other hand, from an environmental protection perspective, it is 
192 natural for the government to subsidize low-polluting technology (when  is small). For d
193 instance, many countries such as the U.S., China, and Japan, are investing heavily in developing 
194 plug-in hybrid or electric vehicles (https://myelectriccar.com.au/incentives/). For this reason, the 
195 subsidy case will be discussed as an extension in Section 4.5. Here in our base model without 
196 subsidy, Eq. (5) is truncated for . After this treatment, Eq. (5) suggests that the government d 
197 would impose a tax on the product only if the manufacturer’s technology is sufficiently 
198 damaging to the environment ( ). This is consistent with many other studies such as Petrakis d 
199 and Xepapadeas (2003), Fujiwara (2009), and Ouchida and Goto (2014). It is also observed that 
200  increases in , indicating that the government will set a higher tax rate for a more It d
201 environmentally damaging technology. This observation is intuitive and holds for all channel 
202 structures throughout this paper.
203 Based on Eq. (5), we can derive the equilibrium values of the other decision variables as 
204 summarized in Table 3 in the Appendix under the “Integrated channel” column. 
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205 3.2. When the manufacturer chooses a decentralized channel 
206 We now move on to study the decentralized channel. Under decentralization, the 
207 manufacturer distributes products through an independent retailer, who in turn sells the product 
208 to the end market. Using backward induction, we first analyze the retailer’s pricing decision. 
209 Given the manufacturer’s wholesale price , the retailer solves w
210 , (6)   max DRp p w q p  
211 where the superscript “D” denotes the decentralized channel and the subscript “R” denotes the 
212 retailer. Solving Eq. (6) gives the retailer’s pricing decision
213 . (7) 
2
D wp w  
214 Anticipating Eq. (7), the manufacturer maximizes its profit expressed by 
215 . (8)    max D D DMw w t q p w  
216 Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (8), we can express the manufacturer’s profit as a function of its 
217 wholesale price. Solving problem (8), we obtain the manufacturer’s wholesale price as 
218 . (9) 
2
D tw t  
219 Eq. (9) suggests that the manufacturer actually transfers half of the environmental tax onto 
220 the retailer, indicating that the retailer is implicitly taxed under this base model. 
221 Knowing the responses of the manufacturer and the retailer as in Eq. (7) and Eq. (9), the 
222 government sets a tax rate to maximize social welfare expressed by Eq. (2), resulting in 
223 . (10)
3 ,  if 3
0,  otherwise 
D
d d
dt
  
   
224 Following the same line of reasoning as Eq. (5), this base model truncates the negative tax 
225 (or subsidy) when  , and the subsidy case will be discussed as an extension in Section 4.6. 3d 
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226 Based on Eq. (10), we obtain the equilibrium values of the other decision variables as shown in 
227 Table 3 in Appendix under the “Decentralized channel” column. 
228 Comparing Eq. (5) and Eq. (10) regarding the tax rate, we readily have 
229 Proposition 1. The government’s optimal tax policy with a single supply chain satisfies 
230 (a). If , then . d  0I Dt t 
231 (b). If , then . 3d   0I Dt t 
232 (c). If , then . 3d  0I Dt t 
233 Proof. A direct comparison of the tax rates under decentralization and integration in Table 3 
234 confirms the relationships given in this proposition.
235 Proposition 1 suggests that the government’s environmental tax policy critically depends on 
236 the manufacturer’s channel choices and how environmentally damaging the manufacturer’s 
237 technology is. Specifically, if the manufacturer’s technology is sufficiently low-polluting ( ), d 
238 the government will not impose an environmental tax on the manufacturer, regardless of the 
239 channel structures (Proposition 1(a)). Next, if the manufacturer’s technology is intermediately 
240 polluting, as in Proposition 1(b), the government will impose a tax on the integrated 
241 manufacturer but not on the decentralized manufacturer. This is because, compared with the 
242 decentralized channel, the integrated manufacturer tends to produce more products, resulting in 
243 more environmental damage. Thus, a tax is necessary to curb the production to protect the 
244 environment. In contrast, the decentralized channel is exempted from taxation because double 
245 marginalization serves as a self-restraining vehicle and restricts the production at a low and less 
246 polluting level. Simply speaking, the decentralized channel is less polluting because of double 
247 marginalization. Finally, Proposition 1(c) suggests that the government always imposes a tax on 
248 the manufacturer under both the integrated and the decentralized channels if its technology is 
13
249 highly detrimental to the environment. Note that, although both channels are taxed, the integrated 
250 channel bears a higher tax rate than the decentralized channel. 
251 In summary, under endogenous environmental taxation, the manufacturer enjoys a lower tax 
252 rate under decentralization than under integration when the production technology is sufficiently 
253 damaging to the environment. Next, we will show that this benefit of decentralization has a 
254 critical effect on the manufacturer’s channel strategy. 
255 Based on the manufacturer’s profits shown in Table 3 in Appendix, we obtain:
256 Proposition 2. Under endogenous environmental taxation with a single supply chain, we have 
257 (a). If , then . d  D IM M  
258 (b). If , then  if , and  otherwise, with equality 3d   D IM M    2 2 1 3d    D IM M  
259 holding at .   2 2 1d  
260 (c). If , then . 3d  2D IM M  
261 Proof. See Appendix. 
262 Proposition 2(a) is a benchmark case with no environmental tax on low-polluting technology. 
263 This standard result states that the decentralized channel suffers from double marginalization, 
264 leading to lower manufacturer profit. We place it here just to highlight the effect of 
265 environmental taxation in the remaining parts. 
266 Proposition 2(b) suggests that, when the technology is of an intermediately polluting range, 
267 the manufacturer profits more by choosing decentralization (integration) if the technology is in 
268 the higher-polluting (lower-polluting) end of this range. The reason is that, for intermediately 
269 polluting technology, the government treats the two channels differently by imposing an 
270 environmental tax on the integrated channel while leaving the decentralized channel tax free. 
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271 From the manufacturer’s perspective, integration improves efficiency but incurs an 
272 environmental tax, while decentralization suffers from double marginalization but enjoys tax 
273 exemption. When the technology is relatively low-polluting ( ), efficiency  2 2 1d   
274 improvement for the integrated channel is more than enough to offset the environmental tax. On 
275 the other hand, if the technology is sufficiently damaging to the environment (
276 ), decentralization rakes in more profit for the manufacturer as the tax saving  2 2 1 3d   
277 outweighs the efficiency loss caused by double marginalization. This result implies that, under 
278 endogenous environmental taxation, the manufacturer’s channel choice does not follow the 
279 conventional case as it is contingent upon how environmentally damaging its technology is. 
280 In Proposition 2(c), the manufacturer always prefers the decentralized to the integrated 
281 channel when its technology is highly detrimental to the environment ( ). More precisely, 3d 
282 the manufacturer’s profit from the decentralized channel is twice that from the integrated channel. 
283 The reason, again, is that, under endogenous environmental taxation, the manufacturer benefits 
284 from a lower tax rate under decentralization, and this tax saving effect outweighs the efficiency 
285 loss when the technology is highly polluting. 
286 In summary, our analyses suggest that, under endogenous environmental taxation, a 
287 monopolistic manufacturer should sell through a private retailer if its technology is sufficiently 
288 polluting. This result relies on a decision sequence that the government sets the tax rate 
289 conditional on the manufacturer’s channel choice, i.e., the manufacturer is the leader and the 
290 government is the follower. This decision sequence can be justified from three angles:
291 First, it is common to observe that governments adjust various policies based on industry 
292 structure in practice (Aalders and Wilthagen, 1997; Tompkin, 2001; Braithwaite, 2007; 
293 Braithwaite et al., 2007). For instance, Aalders and Wilthagen (1997) argued that, in 
15
294 environmental regulation, reflexive administrative laws can be feasible and desirable, calling for 
295 a “negotiating government”. Using taxation data, Braithwaite (2007) established normative and 
296 explanatory arguments in favor of responsive regulation in a taxation context. Similarly, 
297 empirical taxation data showed that responsive regulation is a viable way to achieve effective 
298 regulatory outcome. Furthermore, in food safety regulation, Tompkin (2001) reported that many 
299 interactions between the government and industry contribute to improved safety in food supply. 
300 Corresponding to our model setting, different channel structures can be treated as different 
301 industry structures with the government adopting responsive taxation contingent upon the 
302 manufacturers’ channel choice. 
303 Second, the manufacturer’s channel choice is typically a longer-term, more strategic 
304 decision than the government’s tax rate setting, especially when the government follows a 
305 responsive regulation strategy. That is, compared with the manufacturer’s changing its channel 
306 structure, if the legislation allows the government to adjust the environmental tax rate relatively 
307 expeditiously (especially for lowering the tax rate), then it is likely that the government will re-
308 optimize the tax rate in response to a change in the industry structure.
309 The third point supporting our decision sequence assumption is that the government (from a 
310 social welfare maximization perspective) is indifferent in the manufacturer’s channel choice if 
311 the technology is sufficiently polluting. To see this, let us compare the integrated and the 
312 decentralized channels in Table 3 in Appendix. For , the retail price and quantity, and the 3d 
313 social welfare are all the same under the two channels. As a matter of fact, they are all at the 
314 first-best level. Note that social welfare herein consists of tax revenue, industry profit and 
315 consumer surplus. Higher industry profit under decentralization is simply due to a tax revenue 
316 transfer from the government compared to the integrated channel structure. The reduction in tax 
16
317 revenue is counterbalanced by the increased profit, thereby resulting in the same first-best social 
318 welfare for both channels. This means that the government has no incentive to be the leader in 
319 the game: by setting the tax rate conditional on the manufacturer’s channel choice, the first-best 
320 social welfare is still attainable. In addition, if the manufacturer decentralizes, the government 
321 achieves the first-best social welfare with a lower tax rate, a higher industry profit, and the same 
322 consumer surplus, and thus may gain higher public support.
323 The above observation also implies that, the manufacturer’s higher profit under 
324 decentralization stems from the tax cut for a less polluting industry structure, which does not 
325 affect social welfare or consumer surplus if its technology is sufficiently polluting. When the 
326 manufacturer’s technology is not so polluting ( ), it can be verified that social welfare is 3d 
327 lower under decentralization. In this case, the production quantity under decentralization is lower 
328 than the first-best level, which means that, the problem at hand is no longer environmental 
329 damage caused by excessive production but the economic efficiency loss caused by the firms’ 
330 market power. Because we do not consider government subsidy (negative tax) in the base case to 
331 improve economic efficiency, the first-best social welfare is no longer attainable when the 
332 technology is low-polluting (  under decentralization, or  under integration). In 3d  d 
333 conclusion, the manufacturer’s higher profit under decentralization may deteriorate social 
334 welfare and consumer surplus only if its technology is low-polluting enough that environmental 
335 protection is no longer the focal issue.
336 Our results can also be interpreted from a prescriptive perspective: For a heavily polluting 
337 industry, the decentralized channel structure is a better choice because it offers a higher industry 
338 profit under the same environmental protection goal (the same production level, social welfare 
339 and consumer surplus). Therefore, the government should set its tax policy to induce the 
17
340 manufacturer to decentralize. In this regard, the aforesaid “decision sequence assumption” 
341 becomes irrelevant: if the government is the leader, it should announce that the tax rate will be 
342 conditional on the manufacturer’s channel choice, leading to the same result as presented earlier.
343 4. Extensions and Discussions
344 This section discusses different extensions for the base model to examine the robustness of 
345 our analytical results in Section 3. 
346 4.1. Extension with a linear environmental damage cost
347 The base model adopts a quadratic function to gauge marginally increasing environmental 
348 damage cost. In reality, it is common that this cost may assume a linear form. In addition, linear 
349 cost has been empirically examined and widely adopted in theoretical studies (Mäler, 1991; 
350 Richard, 1995). As such, our first extension considers a linear instead of a quadratic 
351 environmental damage cost function. In this case, social welfare is expressed as 
352 . Similarly, the equilibrium result is obtained as shown in Table 4 in 21
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SW q q dq      
353 Appendix. In the following analysis, it is assumed that  to ensure that the equilibrium d 
354 quantity is positive and the retail price is larger than the wholesale price under decentralization. 
355 Given this assumption, we can easily extend Propositions 1 and 2 as follows by examining the 
356 equilibrium outcomes in Table 4. Here we assume the superscript “DL” denotes the decentralized 
357 channel and “IL” the integrated channel with a linear environmental damage cost. 
358 Lemma 1. Comparing the tax rates under integration and decentralization in Table 4, we have 
359 (a). If , then . (b). If , then . (c). If , then 
2
d  0IL DLt t  3
2 4
d   0IL DLt t  3
4
d 
360 .0IL DLt t 
361 Proposition 3. Under a linear environmental damage cost, we have 
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362 (a). If , then . 1
2
d  DL ILM M  
363 (b). If , then  if , and  otherwise, with 1 3
2 4
d   DL ILM M   2 31 4 4d 
      
DL IL
M M  
364 equality if and only if .  21
4
d      
365 (c). If , then . 3
4
d  2DL ILM M  
366 Proof. See Appendix.
367 Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 clearly demonstrate that the structural insights obtained in 
368 Propositions 1 and 2 remain valid under a linear damage cost: when environmental damage is 
369 sufficiently small ( ), both channels are left untaxed and the manufacturer achieves higher 1
2
d 
370 profitability under integration; when environmental damage is in the middle range ( ), 1 3
2 4
d  
371 the government imposes an environmental tax on the integration channel, but leaves the 
372 decentralization channel untaxed. This tax policy allows the manufacturer to close in its 
373 profitability gap under decentralization with that under integration and eventually achieve a 
374 higher profit under decentralization if ; when environmental damage is sufficiently 21
4
d      
375 large ( ), both channels are taxed, but decentralization enjoys a lower tax rate. In this case, 3
4
d 
376 the manufacturer’s profitability doubles under decentralization compared to the integration case. 
377 In comparison with the result in Propositions 1 and 2, the only difference is the change in 
378 thresholds. Therefore, replacing the quadratic environmental cost function in Eq. (2) with a linear 
379 cost does not qualitatively change our results except for shifting the threshold values. 
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380 4.2. Extension with operational efficiency under integration  
381 In supply chain management, it is well known that vertical integration helps supply chain 
382 partners better coordinate their decisions and leads to operational efficiency gains. The second 
383 extension entertains this idea and incorporates operational efficiency into our model. More 
384 specifically, we consider the case where the integrated channel is less polluting due to more 
385 efficient operations. Mathematically, we express this integration efficiency as follows: 
386 , (11)
Environmental damageTraditional social welfare
2 2
Environmental damageTraditional social welfare
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
DE
IE
SW q q dq
SW q q dq
 
  
      

 
387 where the superscript “DE” denotes the decentralized channel and “IE” the integrated channel 
388 under efficiency concerns.  In Eq. (11),  integration has a potential efficiency gain as expressed 
389 by  , where  and  corresponds to the previous benchmark case without 21
2
dq  0,1  1 
390 any efficiency gain and  means less environmental damage due to integration efficiency. 1 
391 Based on this formulation, we obtain the equilibrium result in Table 5 in Appendix and the 
392 following result. 
393 Lemma 2. With operational efficiency under integration, the government’s optimal tax rates 
394 satisfy 
395 (i). If , (a). If , then . (b). If , then . (c). If , 1
3
  d  0
IE DEt t  3d    0
IE DEt t  3d 
396 then . 0IE DEt t 
397 (ii). If , (a). If , then . (b). If , then . (c). If 10
3
  3d  0IE DEt t  3 d    0
DE IEt t 
398 , then .d  0
DE IEt t 
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399 When the operational efficiency is not so dramatic (i.e., , where a lower  means a 1
3
  
400 higher operational efficiency), case (i) yields the same structural insights as Proposition 1 in the 
401 base model: the government leaves both channels untaxed for sufficiently low-polluting 
402 production ( ); when the pollution level increases (a larger d), the government starts d 
403 imposing an environmental tax on the integration channel and, lastly, on the decentralization 
404 channel. On the other hand, if the operational efficiency is high enough (i.e.,  or  is small 1
3
  
405 enough), integration enjoys a preferred environmental tax treatment as long as  .3d 
406 Proposition 4. With operational efficiency under integration, we have 
407 (a). If , then ;
2 2 10
3
   DE IEM M  
408 (b). If , then
2 2 1
3
 
409 (i). If  and  , then ;3d  2
2
  DE IEM M  
410 (ii) If  and , then  for , and  otherwise.3d  2
2
  DE IEM M   2 11 2d 
 
DE IE
M M  
411 (iii) If , then  for , and  otherwise. 3d  DE IEM M  
 2 2 1
d


 DE IEM M  
412 Proof. See Appendix. 
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413
414 Figure 2. Manufacturer profit comparison with operation efficiency under integration 
415 Proposition 4 is visually displayed in Figure 2 (  ). It is clear from the figure that 1 
416 decentralization offers a higher profit for the manufacturer when environmental damage is high 
417 (a larger ) and integration efficiency is not so significant (a larger ). On the other hand, if the d 
418 integration efficiency gain is sufficient (i.e.,  ), then the manufacturer always achieves 2 2 1
3
 
419 better profitability under integration regardless of environmental damage d. 
420 4.3. Extension with transport emission 
421 The base model considers only emission resulting from the production process. When a 
422 retailer is present in a decentralized system, it is natural that more transportation activities will be 
423 involved in serving customer demand and, hence, more transport emission will be incurred. As 
22
424 such, the third extension here considers emission from transportation. By incorporating 
425 environmental damage from transport emission, we have 
426 , (12)
 
 
Environmental damageTraditional social welfare
2 2
Environmental damageTraditional social welfare
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
DT T
IT T T
SW q q d d q
SW q q d d q
 
  
        
 
 
427 where the superscripts “DT” and “IT”, respectively, refer to the decentralized and integrated 
428 channel under transport emission,  is the coefficient of damage due to transportation in Td
429 addition to production. Same as before,  indicates the integrated channel is more  0,1T 
430 efficient in transportation. Based on the equilibrium result in Table 6 in Appendix, we can derive 
431 Proposition 5 as follows. 
432 Lemma 3. With transport emission, the government’s optimal tax rates are related as: 
433 (i). If , (a). If , then . (b). If , then 2 0T T Td d    T Td d   0IT DTt t  3T T Td d d     
434 . (c). If , then . 0IT DTt t  3 Td d  0IT DTt t 
435 (ii). If , (a). If , then . (b). If , then 2 0T T Td d    3 Td d  0IT DTt t  3 T T Td d d     
436 . (c). If , then . 0DT ITt t  T Td d   0DT ITt t 
437 Note that   can be rearranged as , so case (i) corresponds to the 2 0T T Td d    2
T
T
T
d
d
 
438 scenario that integration does not offer a significant transport emission gain. In this case, if the 
439 aggregate emission from production and transport (  under integration or  under T Td d Td d
440 decentralization) is below the corresponding threshold (  under integration or  under  3
441 decentralization), the government will leave the channel untaxed. The structural insights in 
442 Proposition 1 remain valid. Similarly, case (ii) corresponds to a sufficiently high transport 
23
443 efficiency gain due to integration.  In this case, as long as the aggregate emission from 
444 production and transport under decentralization is high enough (i.e., ), the tax rate for 3Td d  
445 the integration channel is always lower than that for the decentralization channel. 
446 Proposition 5. With transport emission, we have the following result. 
447 (a). If , then  for , and  
 2 2 2
max ,0
T
T
T
d
d

       
DT IT
M M    2 2 1 T Td d    DT ITM M  
448 otherwise. 
449 (b). If , then  for , and  
 2 2 2
0
T
T
T
d
d
    DT ITM M     1 2 1 2 T Td d     DT ITM M  
450 otherwise. 
451 Proof. See Appendix.
452 Proposition 5 can be visually illustrated by Figure 3 ( ). It is clear that, under transport 1 
453 emission consideration, the decentralization channel arises as a better choice for the 
454 manufacturer in terms of its profitability only if the environmental damage is sufficiently large (d 
455 is large enough). The specific threshold for d depends on transportation emission dT and 
456 integration efficiency in transportation .T
457 4.4. Extension with a quadratic tax 
458 In this extension, we introduce the tax as a quadratic function to make it consistent with the 
459 quadratic form of the environmental damage term. By entertaining different functional forms of 
460 the tax cost, we wish to examine how robust the main analytical results are. Specifically, we 
461 adopt the tax term . Following the same solution procedure, we can obtain all the 21
2
tq
462 equilibrium results in Table 7 in Appendix. The superscripts “DQ” and “IQ” below refer to the 
24
463 decentralized and integrated channel under quadratic taxation, respectively. Based on the 
464 equilibrium results, we have 
465
466
467 Figure 3. Profit comparisons with transport emission
468 Lemma 4. With a quadratic tax term, comparing the tax rates in Table 7 yields: (a). If , d 
469 then . (b). If , then . (c). If , then . 0IQ DQt t  3d   0IQ DQt t  3d  0IQ DQt t 
470 Lemma 4 clearly demonstrates that the main results of Proposition 1 are directly carried over 
471 to the quadratic taxation case. 
472 Proposition 6. With a quadratic tax term, we obtain 
473 (a). If , then . 3d  DQ IQM M  
474 (b). If , then .3d  DQ IQM M  
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475 Proof. See Appendix.
476 Proposition 6 demonstrates that main conclusion on the manufacturer’s channel selection 
477 relies on the linear tax function. This is fine as linear taxes and charges on pollution emission are 
478 indeed very common in practice. For instance, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 in 
479 America require that States impose fees on air emission, and set the minimum presumptive level 
480 for such fees at $25 per ton of emissions of air toxics and criteria air pollutants. Similarly, New 
481 Mexico, for example, levies fees of $150 per ton for air toxics and $10 per ton for criteria 
482 pollutants. Regarding solid wastes, cities such as Portland, Lansing and San Jose have also 
483 implemented charges proportional to the volume of emission (U.S. Environmental Protection 
484 Agency, 2004). On the other hand, the general trend of potential benefit of decentralization still 
485 holds true under quadratic taxes as it helps the manufacturer to close in the profitability gap due 
486 to efficiency loss when environmental damage is large enough ( ), but this benefit is 3d 
487 insufficient to make the decentralization channel outperform the integration channel. 
488 4.5. Extension with an environmentally-friendly manufacturer 
489 In the base model in Section 3, the manufacturer is only concerned with profit maximization. 
490 As observed in business practice and recent research, corporations may consider other objectives 
491 such as social and environmental performance on top of profitability (Bian et al., 2016; Ni et al., 
492 2010, Ni and Li, 2012). Along this line of thinking, this extension incorporates the 
493 manufacturer’s environmental concerns into its objective function by assigning a weight to the 
494 environmental damage as shown below: 
495  under integration, and  21max
2
IEn
Mp
p t q dq   
496  under decentralization,  21max
2
DEn
Mw
w t q dq   
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497 where the superscripts “DEn” and “IEn” below, respectively, denote the decentralized and 
498 integrated channel with environmental concerns,  represents the manufacturer’s weight  0,1 
499 on the environmental performance in its goal.  means that the manufacturer gives 1 
500 environment a full consideration and  stands for a profit-maximizing manufacturer as 0 
501 given in the base model in Section 3. Equilibrium outcomes are shown in Table 8 and the tax rate 
502 and channel comparison results are derived as follows. 
503 Lemma 5. With an environmentally-friendly manufacturer, comparing the tax rates in Table 8 
504 leads to: (a). If , then . (b). If , then . (c). If , d  0IEn DEnt t  3d   0IEn DEnt t  3d 
505 then . 0IEn DEnt t 
506 Once again, the government’s tax policies with an environmentally-friendly manufacturer 
507 follow the same pattern as shown in Proposition 1 for the base model. 
508 Proposition 7. With an environmentally-friendly manufacturer, we have 
509 (a). If , then . d  DEn IEnM M  
510 (b). If , then  for , and  3d   DEn IEnM M    22 1 4 10 8 32 1 d          DEn IEnM M  
511 otherwise, with equality holding at .  
 22 1 4 10 8
2 1
d
   

   
 
512 (c). If , then . 3d  DEn IEnM M  
513 Proof. See Appendix.
514 It is clear from Proposition 7 that, with an environmentally-friendly manufacturer who is 
515 concerned with both profit and environmental performance, the structural insights in Proposition 
516 2 remain valid except for the shifted critical threshold d in Proposition 7(b) beyond which 
517 decentralization arises as the better choice. Another minor difference is that the manufacturer’s 
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518 profit under decentralization is no longer twice as much as that under integration when . 3d 
519 This result is natural given that the manufacturer now has both economic and non-economic 
520 considerations.
521 4.6. Discussions of the subsidy case 
522 As illustrated in Eqs. (5) and (10) in Section 3, our base model truncates the government tax 
523 to zero when environmental damage is sufficiently small. This treatment does not allow for 
524 subsidies with a low polluting technology (when d is small). In practice, it is common to observe 
525 that governments provide subsidies to greener or less polluting technologies. For instances, 
526 consumers purchasing either plug-in hybrids or electric cars can obtain tax credits in many 
527 countries including the U.S.A. and Canada. To allow subsidies for low polluting technology, the 
528 only change is not to truncate the negative taxes (or subsidies) in the equilibrium tax expressions 
529 in Table 3. In this case, the tax rates for the integrated and decentralized channels will both be 
530 continuous and become negative (subsidies) when d is sufficiently small (  for the integrated d 
531 channel and  for the decentralized channel). By deleting the two columns under the 3d 
532 heading  and  in Table 3, one can derive the equilibrium results by allowing d  3d 
533 subsidies (Note that the equilibrium holds for any d). A direct comparison of the tax rates and the 
534 manufacturer’s profitability lead to the following results: 
535 Lemma 6. When the government offers subsidies for low polluting technology, its optimal 
536 policy with a single supply chain satisfies 
537 (a). If , then . d  0D It t 
538 (b). If , then . 3d   0D It t 
539 (c). If , then . 3d  0 D It t 
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540 Proposition 8. Under endogenous environmental taxation and subsidies with a single supply 
541 chain, we have . 2D IM M  
542 Lemma 6 and Proposition 8 strengthen the analytical results in Section 3: if the government 
543 offers subsidies for low-polluting technology, decentralization is always better than integration 
544 as the manufacturer doubles its profit under decentralization. The reason is clearly presented in 
545 Proposition 8: if the production is sufficiently green ( ), both channels will receive subsidies d 
546 but decentralization enjoys a higher subsidy; with a larger environmental damage ( ), 3d  
547 the decentralization channel still receives a subsidy, but the integration channel starts paying 
548 taxes; when environmental damage is sufficiently large ( ), both channels are taxed, but 3d 
549 the decentralization channel receives a lower tax rate. 
550 5. Channel strategies with two competing supply chains 
551 First, additional notations to be used in this section are listed in Table 2 below. 
552 Table 2. Notations for the case of two competing supply chains ( )., 1,2;i j i j 
Variable and parameter Definition
iq Product i’s quantity.
ip The retail price of the product i.
iw The wholesale price of the products
 The degree of substitutability between the two products (
) to denote the competition level between the two  0,1 
supply chains
U Social welfare without incorporating environmental 
externalities
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553 We proceed to conduct our analysis of channel strategies for two manufacturers 
554 (manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2, hereafter) within two competing supply chains (supply 
555 chain 1 and supply chain 2, correspondingly). Suppose that manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2 
556 produce two substitutable products, product 1 and product 2, respectively. Following Singh and 
557 Vives (1984), we employ the standard quadratic concave utility function expressed by
558 ,     2 21 2 1 2 1 1 2 21, 22U q q q q q q q q      
559 Thus, consumer surplus after purchasing  units at price  is given byiq ip
560 .     1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2, ,CS q q U q q p q p q  
561 Maximizing  gives  1 2,CS q q
562 , (13)   , ,  , 1,2;i i j i jp q q q q i j i j      
563 where  is the price cap,  measures the sensitivity of product i’s price to its own 0  0 
564 demand, and  denotes the degree of substitutability between product i and product j.  0,1 
565 Note that we do not consider the homogeneous goods case ( ) where the standard Bertrand 1 
566 Paradox arises and the manufacturers are indifferent in channel strategies. Without loss of 
567 generality, the manufacturers’ marginal production costs and per-unit retailing costs are 
568 normalized to zero. Inversing Eq. (13), we obtain the demand functions as follows: 
569 . (14)     2
1
, , , 1,2;
1
i j
i i j
p p
q p p i j i j
  
 
    
570 Taking into account environmental damage, the government’s objective is to maximize 
571 social welfare given by 
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572 , (15)
   
traditional social welfare
2
1 2 1 2
traditional social welfare
2
environmental dam
2 2
1 2 1
a
2
g
2 1 2
e
1
1,
2
1 1( ) ( 2 ) ( )
2 2
SW U q q d q q
q q q q q q d q q  
  
      


573 In Eq. (15), the first term denotes the total surplus from production and consumption, and the 
574 second term denotes environmental damage caused by the manufacturers’ productions. Note that, 
575 in the second term of Eq. (15), we assume that the two manufacturers’ technologies are equally 
576 damaging to the environment. As our focus is to examine the strategic implications of 
577 environmental taxation on the manufacturers’ channel decision, this symmetric technology 
578 assumption helps us to examine the impact without worrying about whether it is due to the tax 
579 effect or technology difference (Fujiwara, 2009). 
580 With two competing supply chains, the decision sequence is as follows (Figure 4). In the 
581 first stage, both manufacturers simultaneously choose between an integrated channel and a 
582 decentralized channel. Second, with the selected channel structure, the government sets a per-
583 unit tax rate upon the manufacturers' production quantities. In the third stage, the manufacturer 
584 who chooses to decentralize sets a wholesale price. Finally, retail price competition occurs in the 
585 product market. This decision sequence, except for the government level, has been widely used 
586 in the literature (e.g., McGuire and Staelin 1983, Bhardwaj and Balasubramanian 2005, Piccolo 
587 and Reisinger 2011). As discussed earlier in Section 3, the government level is justified from 
588 three different angles: when the government is responsively regulating environmental taxation 
589 based on the manufacturers’ channel structure, when manufacturers’ channel choices are longer-
590 term and more strategic decisions than the government’s tax rate setting, and from a prescriptive 
591 perspective, the government as the leader should announce different tax rates conditional on 
31
592 manufacturers’ channel decision. To ensure sub-game perfection, we adopt backward induction 
593 to derive the equilibrium solutions. 
594
Both manufacturers simultaneously choose between 
an integrated and a decentralized channel
The government sets a per-unit tax rate upon the 
manufacturers’ production quantities
The manufacturer who chooses to decentralize sets 
a wholesale price
Retail price competition occurs in the product 
market
595 Figure 4. Decision sequence with two competing supply chains
596 With two competing supply chains, we use the superscript “XY” to indicate various channel 
597 structures, where X (I or D) and Y (I or D) indicate the channel decision by manufacturer 1 and 2, 
598 respectively, and I signifies the manufacturer’s choice of integration and D means that the 
599 manufacturer chooses to distribute its product through a retailer. 
600 In what follows, we will successively discuss each channel structure. By comparison, we 
601 can derive the final equilibrium channel structures. Channel structures “DI” and “ID” are 
602 symmetric in terms of manufacturer 1 and 2’s channel choices. 
603 5.1 Channel structure II 
604 We first consider channel structure II, where both manufacturers 1 and 2 choose to integrate. 
605 Given the government’s environmental tax rate t, manufacturer i solves the following problem 
606 , (16)     ,max , , ,  , 1,2;
i
II
M i i j i i i jp
p p p t q p p i j i j    
32
607 where the subscript “M,i” denotes manufacturer i. Substituting Eq. (14) into Eq. (16) and solving 
608 the corresponding first-order conditions (FOCs) yield the manufacturers’ pricing decisions 
609 . (17)     1 2 1 2II II
t
p t p t
 

   
610 Anticipating Eq. (17), the government decides the optimal tax rate to maximize social 
611 welfare given by Eq. (15), which gives 
612 , (18)
 
 
22 1
,  if 
2 1
0,  otherwise 
II
II
d
d dt d
   
     
613 where 
614 . (19)
21
2
IId  
615 Similar to the single supply chain case, the base model does not consider subsidies and Eq. 
616 (18) is truncated for  . From Eqs. (18)-(19),  can be viewed as a tax-free polluting IId d IId
617 threshold of the technology. The government will impose an environmental tax on channel 
618 structure II only if the technology is more polluting than . IId
619 It should be mentioned here that, when , the environmental tax  given by Eq. (18) 0  IIt
620 does not reduce to  given by Eq. (5). That is, when the two manufacturers’ products are It
621 independent of each other, the government does not treat them as two separate monopolistic 
622 manufacturers when setting the environmental tax. The reason is simple:  only means that 0 
623 the two manufacturers do not interact in the product market, while their pollutions are “mutually 
624 enhancing” in causing environmental damage in the sense that each additional unit of emission 
625 by one manufacturer will be causing more marginal damage to the environment compared to the 
626 previous emission by the other manufacturer. Actually, because of this ‘mutually enhancing’ 
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627 pollution effect, it can be verified that, setting  in  gives a more stringent environmental 0  IIt
628 tax (higher tax rate and lower tax-free polluting threshold) than  does.It
629 Based on Eq. (18), all other results are derived and summarized in Table 9 in the Appendix. 
630 5.2 Channel structure ID
631 Next, we consider the channel structure where one manufacturer chooses integration while 
632 the other distributes its product through an independent retailer. Due to structural symmetry, we 
633 only consider the case where manufacturer 1 chooses integration whereas manufacturer 2 
634 distributes through an independent retailer (retailer 2). 
635 Given the government’s tax rate t and manufacturer 2’s wholesale price , manufacturer 1 2w
636 and retailer 2 simultaneously decide their retail prices in the end market to maximize their profits  
637 . (20)
     
     
1
2
,1 1 2 1 1 1 2
,2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
max , ,
max , ,
ID
Mp
ID
Rp
p p p t q p p
p p p w q p p
      
638 Solving the FOCs from Eq. (20), we obtain 
639 . (21)
    
    
2
1 2 2
2
2 2 2
1 2 2
,
4
1 2 2
,
4
ID
ID
w t
p w t
w t
p w t
   

   

           
640 Expecting Eq. (21), manufacturer 2 chooses the optimal wholesale price  to maximize its 2w
641 profit 
642 . (22)        
2
,2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2max , , , ,
ID ID ID
Mw
w t w t q p w t p w t  
643 Solving Eq. (22) yields 
644 . (23)        2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
ID tw t
    

     
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645 Given the responses in Eq. (21) and Eq. (23), the government sets the optimal tax rate to 
646 maximize social welfare expressed by Eq. (15), yielding 
647 , (24)
    
    
22 2 2 3 4
22 2 3 4
6 3 1 28 8 25 4 6
,  if 
6 3 1 20 4 19 4
0,  otherwise
ID
ID
d
d d
t d
               
                  
648 where  is the tax-free polluting threshold under channel structure ID and is given byIDd
649 . (25)
  
 
2 2 3 4
22
1 28 8 25 4 6
6 3
IDd
      
    
 
650 Based on Eq. (24), all other results are obtained and summarized in Table 10 in Appendix. 
651 5.3 Channel structure DD 
652 In this subsection, we discuss channel structure DD, where manufacturers 1 and 2 choose to 
653 distribute through retailers 1 and 2, respectively. Given the government’s tax rate and the 
654 manufacturers’ wholesale prices, both retailers simultaneously decide their optimal retail prices 
655 in the product market. Mathematically, the retailers’ problems are given by 
656 , (26)
     
     
1
2
,1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
,2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
max , ,
max , ,
DD
Rp
DD
Rp
p p p w q p p
p p p w q p p
      
657 where the subscripts “R,1” and “R,2” denote retailer 1 and retailer 2, respectively. Solving the 
658 FOCs from Eq. (26) yields 
659 . (27)     21 2 2, ,  , 1,2;4 i jDDi i j w wp w w i j i j        
660 Expecting the retailers’ responses in Eq. (27), the manufacturers independently set their 
661 wholesale prices to maximize their profits 
662 . (28)        ,max , , , , ,  , 1,2;
i
DD DD DD
M i i j i i i i j j i jw
w w w t q p w w p w w i j i j    
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663 Solving Eq. (28), we obtain the manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices as: 
664 . (29)        21 2 21 2 24 2DD DD
t
w t w t
   
 
      
665 Knowing Eq. (27) and Eq. (29), the government sets the optimal tax rate to maximize social 
666 welfare in Eq. (15), resulting in  
667 , (30)
    
   
2 2 2
2
2 1 3
2 ,  if 
2 2 1
0,  otherwise
DD
DD
d
d d
t d
      
            
668 where  is the tax-free polluting threshold under channel structure DD and is obtained as DDd
669 (31)
  2 2
2
1 3
2
DDd
  
  
670 Based on Eq. (30), all other solutions are obtained and summarized in Table 11 in Appendix. 
671 Next, we graphically examine how the environment tax evolves with the environmental 
672 damage parameter d under different channel structures. By setting ,  and , 1  0.5  0.5 
673 Fig. 5 below clearly demonstrates that the government starts imposing environmental taxes at 
674 different damage levels for different channel structures and the more integrated channel 
675 structures bear heavier tax burdens. In addition, the tax rate always increases in the degree of 
676 environmental damage, corresponding to a more stringent tax policy on the manufacturers if their 
677 production is more polluting. 
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678
679 Figure 5. Evolution of the tax rate with respect to the degree of environmental damage
680 Analytically, comparing the three tax-free polluting thresholds given by Eq. (19), Eq. (25) 
681 and Eq. (31), we have  for any . Then, by examining Eq. (18), Eq. (24) II ID DDd d d   0,1 
682 and Eq. (30) regarding the tax rate, we have the following results. 
683 Proposition 9. The government’s optimal tax policy with two competing supply chains satisfies 
684 (a). If , then . IId d 0II ID DDt t t  
685 (b). If , then . II IDd d d  0II ID DDt t t  
686 (c). If , then . ID DDd d d  0II ID DDt t t  
687 (d). If , then . DDd d 0II ID DDt t t  
688 Proof. See Appendix. 
689 In resonance with the visual display in Fig. 5, Proposition 9 confirms that, under endogenous 
690 environmental taxation, when the channel structure becomes more decentralized (from II to ID to 
691 DD), the environmental tax becomes less stringent (the tax-free polluting threshold becomes 
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692 higher, and the tax rate becomes lower). The reason is the same as that of Proposition 1: a more 
693 decentralized channel structure tends to produce less due to double marginalization, and thereby 
694 is less polluting. 
695 After discussing the aforementioned channel structures and the government’s tax policies, 
696 we proceed to analyze the manufacturers’ equilibrium channel strategies. We first present the 
697 classic result of McGuire and Staelin (1983) under no environmental tax as a benchmark.
698 Benchmark Theorem (McGuire and Staelin, 1983). Under no environmental tax, with two 
699 competing supply chains, channel structure II is the unique equilibrium channel structure if 
700 , and channel structures DD and II are both equilibria if .0.931  0.931 
701 The benchmark theorem states that, when there is no environmental tax, channel structure II 
702 is always an equilibrium, and channel structure DD arises as an additional equilibrium only if the 
703 products are highly substitutable. This result reveals a benefit of decentralization as the 
704 independent retailers help to mitigate competition between manufacturers, thereby enhancing 
705 their profits, which is the so-called “retailer buffer” effect (Wang et al., 2011). With highly 
706 substitutable products, this retailer buffer effect outweighs double marginalization. In this case, 
707 the competition is so intense that DD arises as an equilibrium.
708 Under endogenous environmental taxation in this paper, besides the aforesaid retailer buffer 
709 effect, the decentralized channel structure also has the tax saving effect as shown in Proposition 
710 3. Therefore, the condition for DD to be an equilibrium under endogenous environmental 
711 taxation is more general compared to the benchmark theorem. Define  as 1d
712  .
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2 2 2 2 2
1 22 3 2
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4 2 4 2 6 3 2 4
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d
     
         
    
                   
    
713 We then have the following proposition:
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714 Proposition 10. Under endogenous environmental taxation with two competing supply chains, II 
715 is the unique equilibrium channel structure if and only if  and , otherwise DD and 0.931  1d d
716 II are both equilibria, where  satisfies  for ,  for , and 1d 1
ID DDd d d  0.931  1 IDd d 0.931 
717  for .1
IDd d 0.931 
718 Proof. II is an equilibrium channel structure if and only if . That is,  2 2
II ID
M M   2 2II IDM M  
719 means that, given that manufacturer 1 chooses integration, manufacturer 2 has no incentive to 
720 choose decentralization. By symmetry between the two manufacturers, this means that no one 
721 has the incentive to change if the channel structure is II, and thus II is an equilibrium. Similarly, 
722 DD is an equilibrium channel structure if and only if . Therefore, it suffices to prove 1 1
DD ID
M M  
723 that  holds (II is an equilibrium) for any  and , and  holds (DD is not 2 2
II ID
M M    d 1 1DD IDM M  
724 an equilibrium) if and only if  and . The remainder of the proof consists of basic 0.931  1d d
725 calculations and is moved to the Appendix. 
726 Figure 6 graphically depicts Proposition 10, with  and  being the values of  1.330 0.107
727  at  and , respectively. From Figure 6 and Proposition 10, we can see that, when 1d 0  0.931 
728 , the result under endogenous environmental taxation is the same as the benchmark 0.107d 
729 theorem. That is, when , the critical  value above which DD is an equilibrium is 0.107d  
730 , the same as in the benchmark theorem. This means that, when the technology is low-0.931 
731 polluting, the tax saving effect of decentralization does not make a difference, and the condition 
732 for DD to be an equilibrium is the same as in the no-tax case.
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733
734 Figure 6. Equilibrium channel strategies with two competing supply chains
735 It can be seen from Figure 6 and Proposition 10 that the tax saving effect of decentralization 
736 makes a difference when the technology is more polluting than a small threshold ( ). 0.107d 
737 Specifically, when  increases from  to , the critical  value above which DD is d 0.107 1.330 
738 an equilibrium decreases from 0.931 to 0, and when , DD is always an equilibrium 1.330d 
739 regardless of . The implications are that, as the technology becomes more polluting, the 
740 requirement on product substitutability becomes lower for DD to be an equilibrium, and when 
741 the technology is highly polluting, DD is always an equilibrium regardless of product 
742 substitutability.
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743 Figure 6 and Proposition 10 can also be interpreted from the perspective of product 
744 substitutability. That is, when  increases from 0 to 0.931, the critical  value above which DD  d
745 is an equilibrium decreases from  to , and when , DD is always an 1.330 0.107 0.931 
746 equilibrium regardless of . In other words, as the products become more substitutable, the d
747 requirement on technology polluting level becomes lower for DD to be an equilibrium. 
748 Especially, when the products are highly substitutable, DD is always an equilibrium regardless of 
749 how polluting the technology is.
750 One technical detail about Proposition 10 worth mentioning is that, it is not a coincidence 
751 that  at . To see this, denoting d1 and dID by  and  to highlight that 1
IDd d 0.931   1d   IDd 
752 their values change with . From the proof of Proposition 10 in the Appendix,  represents   1d 
753 a combination of  and  such that, when channel structure ID is taxed and DD is not taxed, a  d
754 firm is indifferent between decentralization and integration given that its competitor is 
755 decentralized. That is, it holds  at any point  within the range . ,1 ,1
DD ID
M M     1,d  ID DDd d d 
756 On the other hand,  is the value such that a firm is indifferent between decentralization 0.931 
757 and integration given that its competitor is decentralized when there is no environmental tax 
758 (McGuire and Staelin, 1983). That is, it holds  at  when . Recall ,1 ,1
DD ID
M M   0.931  0ID DDt t 
759 that  when , we readily have  at the point . 0ID DDt t  IDd d ,1 ,1DD IDM M     0.931, 0.931IDd
760 Therefore,  simply reflects that the indifference condition  is    1 0.931 0.931IDd d ,1 ,1DD IDM M  
761 continuous in  at . The essential reason is that the tax rate  given by Eq. (24) is d IDd d IDt
762 continuous in  at .d IDd d
763 In summary, Proposition 10 suggests that, under endogenous environmental taxation, 
764 manufacturers are more likely to decentralize in equilibrium when their technologies are more 
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765 polluting. Similar to the result of McGuire and Staelin (1983) under no environmental tax, it can 
766 be verified that, whenever channel structure DD and II are both equilibria, DD is dominant in 
767 that the manufacturers’ profits are higher. Furthermore, similar to the single supply chain case, 
768 comparing Tables 9 and 11 in the Appendix shows that, for , the retail price and quantity, DDd d
769 and social welfare are all the same and at the first-best level under DD and II. This leads to the 
770 same two important implications as in the single supply chain case. First, manufacturers’ higher 
771 profits under decentralization stem from the tax cut for less polluting industry structures, which 
772 does not affect social welfare or consumer surplus as long as their technologies are polluting 
773 enough that the focal issue remains the environmental damage caused by excessive production 
774 rather than the economic efficiency loss caused by firms’ market power. Second, when the 
775 manufacturers decentralize, the government could achieve the first-best social welfare with a 
776 lower tax rate, a higher industry profit, and the same consumer surplus, and thus may gain higher 
777 public support for its environmental tax policy. The second point also implies that, from a 
778 prescriptive perspective, the government has the incentive to be a follower and set its tax policy 
779 to induce manufactures to decentralize, thereby achieving higher industry profit without hurting 
780 any stakeholder. 
781 Next, by setting  and , Fig. 7 graphically demonstrates how the manufacturers’ 1  0.5 
782 profits vary with the environmental damage parameter d for (a)  and (b)  under 0.5  0.95 
783 different channel structures. Fig. 7(a) indicates that, for  II is the unique 0.5 0.931,  
784 equilibrium when d < 0.5224 and DD arises as another dominant equilibrium when d > 0.5224 
785 (when the profit line for ID-M1 crosses below that for DD). On the other hand, Fig. 7(b) 
786 confirms that, for highly substitutable products when both II and DD are 0.95 0.931,  
787 equilibrium channel structures with DD being the dominant equilibrium regardless of the 
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788 environmental damage level d. In addition, Fig. 7 clearly shows that manufacturers’ profits 
789 always decrease in d once it is high enough to trigger the environmental tax. This means that the 
790 manufacturers are incentivized to improve their production technology in order to boost up their 
791 profitability. 
792       
793 (a)                   (b) 0.5  0.95 
794 Figure 7. Manufacturers’ profits under different channel structures with respect to d
795 Similarly, letting , , and , we plot social welfare under different channel 1  0.5  0.5 
796 structures as functions of the environmental damage parameter d as shown in Fig. 8. It clearly 
797 shows that the traditional ranking of social welfare  holds when the II ID DDSW SW SW 
798 environmental damage level d is relatively low.  On the other hand, when environmental damage 
799 is high enough that , social welfare achieves the first-best level under the two equilibrium DDd d
800 channel structures DD and II (the two social welfare curves coincide) and is higher than that 
801 under the asymmetric channel structures ID and DI. 
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802
803 Figure 8. Social welfare under different channel structures
804 5.4. Discussions on extensions with two competing supply chains 
805 To further examine the robustness of our analytical results for two competing supply chains, 
806 we also consider the same extensions with a single supply chain presented in Section 4. Given 
807 that no additional insights are obtained beyond what we have garnered here, the details are 
808 omitted and only a summary of the results is reported below for the sake of space. 
809 For the linear environmental damage extension, we are able to derive analytical results on 
810 the equilibrium channel structure, which is structurally the same as what is presented in Figure 6 
811 except for shifted d thresholds on the vertical axis and the dividing curve for the two zones with 
812 only II or both DD and II as the equilibrium channel structure.
813 For the extensions with operational efficiency and transport emission, numerical 
814 experiments confirm that the main results in Proposition 10 can be qualitatively carried over. On 
815 the other hand, when subsidies are allowed, both DD and II will always arise as equilibrium 
816 channel structures. 
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817 For the cases with quadratic taxes and environmentally-friendly manufacturers, the complex 
818 functional forms prevent us from deriving any definite results on equilibrium channel structures. 
819 In summary, the main results on equilibrium channel structures for two competing supply 
820 chains can be extended to the majority of the aforesaid extensions, confirming the robustness of 
821 our analytical results. 
822 6. Conclusions 
823 This paper presents a simple model to examine distribution channel strategies under 
824 environmental taxation. The main findings are summarized as follows. The environmental tax 
825 becomes less stringent when the distribution channel structure becomes more decentralized. The 
826 reason is that a more decentralized channel structure tends to produce less due to double 
827 marginalization, and thereby is less polluting. This has important implications on manufacturers’ 
828 channel strategies. First, contrary to the classic double marginalization problem, a monopolistic 
829 manufacturer can benefit from decentralization when its technology is sufficiently polluting. 
830 Second, with two competing manufacturers, both are more likely to decentralize in equilibrium 
831 when their technologies are more environmentally damaging. Moreover, manufacturers’ higher 
832 profits under decentralization stem from the tax cut for less polluting industry structures, which 
833 does not affect the social welfare or consumer surplus as long as their technologies are polluting 
834 enough that environmental protection remains the focal issue. Furthermore, the robustness of the 
835 analytical results is investigated by extending the base models to a variety of scenarios with 
836 linear environmental damage, integration efficiency, transport emission, quadratic taxation, an 
837 environmentally-friendly manufacturer as well as by allowing subsidies for low polluting 
838 technology. 
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839 Our results suggest that, for heavily polluting industries, when the industry structure 
840 becomes more decentralized, the government can achieve its environmental protection goal with 
841 a lower tax rate and higher industry profit, thereby garnering more public support for its 
842 environmental tax policy. Therefore, from a prescriptive viewpoint, the government has the 
843 incentive to set its tax policy conditional on manufacturers’ channel choice, thereby inducing 
844 heavy polluters to decentralize. 
845 Several possible directions can be explored in future research. For instance, it is worthwhile 
846 to examine channel strategies and environmental taxation in a market with uncertainty and 
847 information asymmetry to relax the current perfect information assumption. In addition, this 
848 research considers only exclusive decentralized or integrated channel structure, but multi-
849 channel and omni-channel strategies have been observed in real-world businesses, it will be 
850 worthwhile to consider how manufacturers’ channel selection changes with more complex 
851 channel structures. Still another worthy topic is to add environmental awareness and incorporate 
852 uncertainty into the demand function and examine further how it may affect manufacturers’ 
853 channel decision. 
854 Appendix. 
855 Table 3. Solutions in a single supply chain
Integrated channel Decentralized channel
d  d  3d  3d 
Tax rate (t) 0  d
d
 



0  3d
d
 



Wholesale 
price  (w)
N/A N/A
2
  d
d
 



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Quantity (q)
2

 d

  4

 d

 
Retail price (p)
2
 d
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3
4
 d
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 
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profit ( )M
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2d

 
2
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2
2
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 
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profit ( )R
N/A N/A 2
16
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2
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
 
Channel profit 
( )M R  
2
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2
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857 Table 4. Solutions in a single supply chain with linear environmental damage
Integrated channel Decentralized channel
2
d 
2
d  3
4
d  3
4
d 
Tax rate (t) 0 2d  0 4 3d 
Wholesale 
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N/A N/A
2
 2d 
Quantity (q)
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

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Retail price (p)
2
 d 3
4
 d
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profit ( )M
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859 Table 5. Solutions in a single supply chain with operation efficiency under integration
Integrated channel Decentralized channel
d  d


3d  3d 
Tax rate (t) 0  d
d
  
 


0  3d
d
 



Wholesale 
price  (w)
N/A N/A
2
  d
d
 



Quantity (q)
2

 d

  4

 d

 
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Retail price (p)
2
 d
d
 
 
3
4
 d
d

 
Manufacturer’s 
profit ( )M
2
4

  
2
2d

 
2
8

  
2
2
2
d

 
Retailer’s 
profit ( )R
N/A N/A 2
16

  
2
2d

 
Channel profit 
( )M R  
2
4

  
2
2d

 
23
16

  
2
2
3
d

 
Consumer 
surplus ( )CS
2
8

  
2
22 d

 
2
32

  
2
22 d

 
Social welfare  
( )SW
  2
2
3
8
d  


 
2
2 d

 
  2
2
5
32
d 


 
2
2 d

 
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861 Table 6. Solutions in a single supply chain with transport emission
Integrated channel Decentralized channel
T Td d   T Td d   3 Td d  3 Td d 
Tax rate (t) 0  T T
T T
d d
d d
  
 
 
 
0  3T
T
d d
d d
 

 
 
Wholesale 
price  (w)
N/A N/A
2
  T
T
d d
d d
 

 
 
Quantity (q)
2

 T Td d

   4

 Td d

 
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Retail price (p)
2
  T T
T T
d d
d d
 
 

 
3
4
  T
T
d d
d d



 
Manufacturer’s 
profit ( )M
2
4

  
2
2T Td d

  
2
8

  
2
2
2
Td d

 
Retailer’s 
profit ( )R
N/A N/A 2
16

  
2
2Td d

 
Channel profit 
( )M R  
2
4

  
2
2T Td d

  
23
16

  
2
2
3
Td d

 
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surplus ( )CS
2
8

  
2
2
2 T Td d

  
2
32

  
2
2
2 Td d

 
Social welfare  
( )SW
  2
2
3
8
T Td d  

   
2
2 T Td d

  
  2
2
5
32
Td d 

   
2
2 Td d

 
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863 Table 7. Solutions in a single supply chain with a quadratic tax
Integrated channel Decentralized channel
d  d  3d  3d 
Tax rate (t) 0 d  0 3d 
Wholesale 
price  (w)
N/A N/A
2
  d
d
 



Quantity (q)
2

 d

 4

 d


Retail price (p)
2
 d
d


3
4
 d
d


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Manufacturer’s 
profit ( )M
2
4

  
2
2 d


2
8

  
2
2 d


Retailer’s 
profit ( )R
N/A N/A 2
16

  
2
2d


Channel profit 
( )M R  
2
4

  
2
2 d


23
16

  
2
2
3
3d


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surplus ( )CS
2
8

  
2
22 d


2
32

  
2
22 d


Social welfare  
( )SW
  2
2
3
8
d 


 
2
2 d


  2
2
7
32
d 


 
2
2 d


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865 Table 8. Solutions in a single supply chain with an environmentally-friendly manufacturer
Integrated channel Decentralized channel
d  d  3d  3d 
Tax rate (t) 0  d
d d
 
 

 
0  3d
d d
 
 

 
Wholesale 
price  (w)
N/A N/A  2
4
d
d
  
 


 d d
d d
  
 
 
 
Quantity (q)
2 d

  d d

   4 d

  d d

  
Retail price (p)  
2
d
d
  
 


 1 d
d d
 
 

 
 3
4
d
d
  
 


 1
d d
 
 

 
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Manufacturer’s 
profit ( )M
 
2
2 2 d

 
 
 
2
2
2
2
d
d d
  
 

   
2
2 4 d

 
 
 
2
2
4
2
d
d d
  
 

 
Retailer’s 
profit ( )R
N/A N/A
 
2
24 d

   
2
22 d d

  
Channel profit 
( )M R  
 
2
2 2 d

 
 
 
2
2
2
2
d
d d
  
 

 
 
 
2
2
6
2 4
d
d
  
 


 
 
2
2
6
2
d
d d
  
 

 
Consumer 
surplus ( )CS
 
2
22 2 d

   
2
22 d d

    
2
22 4 d

   
2
22 d d

  
Social welfare  
( )SW
 
 
2
2
3
2 2
d d
d
  
 
 
  
2
2 d d

  
 
 
2
2
7
2 4
d d
d
  
 
 
  
2
2 d d

  
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867 Table 9. Solutions under channel structure II ( )1,2i 
Channel structure II
 IId d  IId d
Tax rate ( )IIt 0  
 
22 1
2 1
d
d
  
 
   
 
Quantity ( )IIiq   1 2

     2 1d

  
Retail price ( IIip
)
 1
2
 


  
2
2 1
d
d

  
Manufacturers’ 
profit ( ),
II
M i
 
  
2
2
1
1 2
 
  

 
 
 
2 2
2
1
2 1d
  
 

    
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Consumer 
surplus ( )IICS
  
2
21 2

   
 
 
2
2
1
2 1d
  
 

    
Social welfare (
)IISW
 
   
2 2
2 22
3 2 2
1 2
d   
  
  
   
2
2 1d

  
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869 Table 10. Solutions under channel structure ID
Channel structure ID
 IDd d  IDd d
Tax rate ( )IDt 0 B
X

Wholesale price ( )IDw   
 2
1 2
2 2
  

 

C
X

Product 1’s quantity ( )1
IDq  
   
2
2
4 2
2 1 2 2
  
   
 
  
  2 24 2 6 3
X
       
Product 2’s quantity ( )2
IDq   2 1 2

      
2 22 6 3
X
     
Product 1’s retail price ( )1
IDp   
  
2
2
1 4 2
2 2 2
   
 
  
 
D
X

Product 2’s retail price ( )2
IDp   
  
2
2
1 3
2 2
  
 
 
 
E
X

Manufacturer 1’s profit ( ),1
ID
M   
    
22 2
22 2
1 4 2
4 1 2 2
   
   
  
  
2
2
F
X

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Manufacturer 2’s profit ( ),2
ID
M      
2
2
1 2
4 1 2 2
  
   
 
  
2
2
G
X

Retailer 2’s profit ( ),2
ID
R  
  
2
2
1
4 1 2
 
  

 
2
2
H
X

Channel 1’s profit ( ),1
ID
M    
    
22 2
22 2
1 4 2
4 1 2 2
   
   
  
  
2
2
F
X

Channel 2’s profit ( ),2 ,2
ID ID
M R      
    
2 2
2 2
1 3
2 1 2 2
  
   
 
  
2
2
I
X

Consumer surplus ( )IDCS  
    
2 3 4 2
22 2
20 4 19 4
8 1 2 2
    
   
   
  
2
22
J
X

Social welfare ( )IDSW
     
2
22 22 28 1 2 2
A
     
 22 26 3
2X
   
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871 .     22 3 4 5 21 76 36 85 41 24 12 6 3A d                 
872 .    22 2 2 3 46 3 1 28 8 25 4 6B d               
873 .     22 2 2 26 3 1 4 3 1C d             
874 .     22 2 26 3 1 2 2D d           
875 .     22 2 26 3 1 2 4 2E d             
876 .    2 22 2 21 4 2 6 3F           
877 .    22 2 2 21 2 4 6 3G           
878 .    2 22 2 21 2 6 3H         
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879 .    22 2 2 22 1 2 3 6 3I           
880  .    22 2 3 41 6 3 20 4 19 4J               
881 .    22 2 3 46 3 1 20 4 19 4X d               
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883 Table 11. Solutions under channel structure DD ( )1,2i 
Channel structure DD
DDd d DDd d
Tax rate ( )DDt 0    22 2 1
L
d

       
Wholesale price ( )DDiw   
2
1 2
4 2
  
 
 
 
 
 
22 1
2 1
d
d
  
 
   
 
Quantity ( )DDiq  
   
2
2
2
1 2 4 2
 
    

     2 1d

  
Retail price ( )DDip   
  
2
2
2 1 3
2 4 2
  
  
 
    
2
2 1
d
d

  
Manufacturers’ profit ( ),
DD
M i    
   
2 2
22
1 2 2
1 2 4 2
   
    
  
   
  
   
2 2 2
22
1 4
2 2 1d
   
  
 
     
Retailers’ profit ( ),
DD
R i   
    
22 2
22 2
1 2
1 2 4 2
  
    
 
   
 
 
2 2
2
1
2 1d
  
 

    
Channel profit ( ), ,
DD DD
M i R i      
    
2 2 2
22 2
2 1 2 3
1 2 4 2
   
    
  
   
  
   
2 2 2
22
2 1 3
2 2 1d
   
  
 
     
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Consumer surplus ( )DDCS  
    
22 2
22 2
2
1 2 4 2
 
    

   
 
 
2
2
1
2 1d
  
 

    
Social welfare ( )DDSW
     
2
22 22 21 2 4 2
K
         
2
2 1d

  
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885 .      2 2 3 22 1 14 12 5 4 4 2K d               
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887 Proof of Proposition 2
888 Part (a) and (c) directly follow from the “Manufacturer’s profit” in Table 3. For part (b), we have
889 , for . 
 
 
2 2 22 2
2 2
2 7
8 8
D I
M M
d d
d d
   
   
        3d  
890 Algebraic calculation shows that  if , and  if 0D IM M     2 2 1 3d    0D IM M   
891 , with equality if and only if  .  2 2 1d     2 2 1d  
892 Proof of Proposition 3
893 Part (a) and (c) directly follow from the “Manufacturer’s profit” in Table 4. For part (b), we have
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903 Proof of Proposition 5
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919 Proof of Proposition 6
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922 Proof of Proposition 7
923 Part (a) and (c) directly follow from the “Manufacturer’s profit” in Table 8. For part (b), we have
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927 Proof of Proposition 9 
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934 This completes the proof. 
935 Proof of Proposition 10 
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972 This completes the proof.
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